During most of the period from 1912 to 1936, Guangdong Province was independent from the central government. The local authorities there were facing a dilemma regarding opium, as others were elsewhere in China. On the one hand, opium was considered the symbol of China's weakness, and its suppression was a top priority; on the other hand, opium taxes represented an indispensable source of fiscal income. Some Guangdong power holders were truly committed to a suppression agenda, especially from 1913 to 1924. During this period, with the exception of a brief interlude from 1915 to 1916, opium laws were prohibition laws. Even if these laws were not always enforced with full vigor, the drug remained illegal in Guangdong. After 1924, opium was legalized, and the authorities openly ruled an opium monopoly. They came out with increasingly comprehensive regulations, which proved successful in increasing opium revenues. Yet, as this article makes clear, there was nothing like direct government control: traditional tax-farming arrangements with local opium merchants (though under stricter supervision) remained the backbone of the monopoly. The article also pays attention to the influence of the Six-Year Plan (1935-1940 launched by the Nanking government. As a credible set of suppression laws, it appealed to the Guangdong progressive elites who were hostile to opium. They urged the local autocrat Chen Jitang to take similar action. Chen made attempts to launch his own plans for suppressing opium, but they were unconvincing and nothing concrete came out of them. This article suggests that, in order to obtain a better understanding of how easily Chen Jitang was driven out of power in the summer of 1936, it is necessary to take into account the significant contribution of the Six-Year Plan in undermining his legitimacy.
Introduction
The Xinzheng period (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) and the Republican period were both characterized by ambitious attempts to reform the Chinese legal system. Scholarly research on this topic is distinguished by a strong focus on the reform efforts of the central governments (Qing, Beiyang, and Guomindang) (Bernhardt and Huang 1994; Huang 2001; Paulès 62 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 7 (June 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-7) story is that of the "lazy taxes" that were imposed on farmers if they did not grow poppies) (Baumler 2007, 90-92; Wang Jinxiang 2005, 106-107) .
Taking Guangdong as an example, this article's main contention is that local opium laws deserve the same serious attention as those enacted by the central government. The period from 1912 to 1936 was chosen because, during most of these years, Guangdong
Province was independent from the central government. This study reveals, first, that genuine and coherent attempts at eradicating opium did not only emanate from the central government. Laws concerned with maximizing opium profit were not necessarily associated with warlord-type regimes; some Guangdong power holders (warlords among them) were truly committed to a suppression agenda, even as they enjoyed de facto independence. When one considers this twenty-four-year period, the general reluctance toward legalizing opium is striking and encompasses both warlords and non-warlords. In every case, opium legalization was decided out of pragmatism, because its resources were badly needed in a highly competitive political environment.
The year 1924 stands as a watershed. From 1913 to 1924 (except during a brief
interlude from 1915 to 1916), opium laws were prohibition laws. Even if they were not always enforced with full vigor, the drug remained illegal. But from 1924 on, legalization was taken for granted, and the authorities became concerned with finding appropriate ways to manage opium distribution while minimizing the political cost of legalization.
Prohibition in Question (1912-1923)
Under the aegis of Hu Hanmin, Guangdong became a stronghold of the revolutionaries as early as November 1911. The revolutionaries, like the central government of the time, were committed to eradicating opium. Regulations prohibiting opium starting on January 1, 1913, were promulgated, making 1912 a transitional year. 5 In August 1912, the opium administration was put under the management of the Guangdong Police Department and its notoriously energetic head, Chen Jinghua. 6 Anti-opium regulations were strictly enforced up to the end of the revolutionaries' rule over Guangdong 7 in August 1913, when Yuan Shikai's protégé Long Jiguang succeeded in expelling the Guomindang. Long declared his commitment to an anti-opium policy and, for one and a half years, he stuck to this position. 8 Yet there are reasons to believe that in 1914 he started to derive some profit from opium by establishing traffic with his native province, Yunnan (where poppy culture was gradually resuming) with his brother, Long Yuguang, acting as an intermediary. 9 Still, Long Jiguang refrained from "crossing the Rubicon" of legalization until 1915, when he was given what he probably regarded as too good an opportunity to refuse.
Long Jiguang as Forerunner: The 1915 Monopoly
Articles 3 and 4 of the 1911 Anglo-Chinese agreements stated that every Chinese province freed of domestic opium and duly inspected by a team of British officials would be closed to imports of Indian opium. Many provinces were affected by these terms in the early years of the Republic, and soon only three provinces remained open to Indian opium:
Guangdong, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu. But even there, local regulations made the consumption of opium impossible. At the same time, in Shanghai and Hong Kong, big stocks of Indian opium were still piled up. According to the 1911 agreements, these inventories could be legally sold on Chinese territory.
10 A solution had to be found. In April 1915, Yuan Shikai appointed Cai Naihuang as special commissioner for the suppression of opium in Guangdong, Jiangxi, and
Jiangsu (Wang Hongbin 1997, 361 ). An agreement between Cai Naihuang and the merchants who held the Hong Kong stocks was signed in October 1915: HK$3,500 would go to the central government coffers along with HK$600 to Long Jiguang's pocket for each of the twelve hundred opium chests purchased by an ad hoc organization, the Yaogao jiancha zongsuo (Medical Paste Inspection Bureau), which was granted the right to sell opium in
Guangdong.
11 It soon turned out, however, that the Yaogao jiancha zongsuo (which was under Long's control) was unwilling to buy the twelve hundred chests as it was supposed to.
Instead, it turned to relatively cheap Yunnan opium, thereby deriving much higher profit margins.
No matter the kind of opium it was selling, a monopoly was put into place. Astutely, Long had used the agreement as an excuse to launch a monopoly allegedly to solve the pending problem of the Hong Kong stocks of Indian opium. Moreover, the agreement was signed by an envoy of the central government. The next year, in a characteristic show of cynicism, Long declared independence from the central government on April 6, 1916 and assassinated Cai Naihuang on April 24, charging him with establishing the monopoly.
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It is worth mentioning that many features of the Long Jiguang monopoly emulated the Ten-Year Plan. This is true of its allegedly temporary nature, as it was meant to last only eighteen months, the time deemed necessary for selling out the stock of Indian opium. Also, smoking houses were forbidden, and permits (available only to old, ill, or inveterate smokers)
were required to be granted the right to smoke. But this monopoly was unique as well-its most notorious innovation being the use of euphemisms. For example, instead of "opium," the Yaogao jiancha zongsuo used the eponym "medicine paste" (yaogao ), as the opium contained a substance that would allegedly ease withdrawal. Long Jiguang opened a path for future Guangdong monopolies, which would generally claim to be temporary and require permits. The word "opium" (yapian ) rarely appeared explicitly. For example, prepared opium would instead be called "detoxification medicine" (jieyan yaopin ) 13 or "detoxification paste" (jieyan yaogao ), 14 and raw opium would be labeled "raw material for detoxification medicine" (jieyan yaoliao ) (figure 1).
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Figure 1. Early 1930s certification stamp for raw opium (jieyanyao yinhua) under the Guangdong jinyanju (Guangdong Opium Suppression Bureau). Source: GA, series 95/1, file 639 (Kowloon maritime customs). Issue (1916 Issue ( -1923 In July 1916, the old Guangxi clique (Lu Rongting, Chen Bingkun, and Mo Rongxin)
Prohibition Becomes a Dead
expelled Long Jiguang. The clique tried to use Sun Yat-sen as a way to enhance his legitimacy, but Sun realized he was deprived of any real power and left for Shanghai in the spring of 1918. The Yaogao jiancha zongsuo was disbanded under the old Guangxi clique, which reverted back to its pre-1915 position: no legal status was granted to opium, but the clique profited through its involvement with an underground trade (Hosoi 1919, 49) . Under these circumstances, the consumption of opium remained limited, as it had been in 1913 and
1914. The old Guangxi clique (which dared to lift the ban on fantan, a gambling game of particularly infamous repute, and farmed out its revenues), considered that the taboo provinces and hence were earmarked as "guest troops" (kejun 军). Some were powerful enough to be a threat to the Guomindang, in particular the twenty-three thousand Yunnanese troops under the leadership of Yang Ximin (Chereparov 1982, 25) . in Guangdong Province. During 1923, Sun Yat-sen's mercenary allies proved to be inveterate smugglers of opium as a way to derive profit and pay their troops. The troops from Yunnanbecause of the strong connections they had with their native province, where opium production was rampant-were especially notorious in this regard (China Weekly Review, March 10, 1923; August 25, 1923) . For Sun, it was the worst possible situation: not only was prohibition an empty word, but opium was profiting his enemies as well as his troublesome allies (potential rivals themselves) instead of himself. 20 The time had come for realpolitik.
In the instruction Sun gave to the newly nominated jinyan duban (opium suppression superintendent), Yang Xiyan, on December 17, 1923, Sun stated that prohibition was useless because smuggling was so widespread, and he connected the issue of legalization to the process of state building, claiming that "prohibition through taxation" (yujinyuzheng ) would have the advantage of providing money for the Beifa.
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The reason that Sun Yat-sen did not simply follow the path of some of his predecessors (like the old Guangxi clique), and profit from opium revenues without making it legal, is that opium legalization was embedded in a strategy of state building. In the short run, the creation of the role of opium suppression superintendent was aimed at depriving the guest troops of their power. In the long run, it was part of an effort to rationalize and centralize tax collection.
Yet there was nationwide consensus during the whole of the Republican era about the need to eradicate opium. Nobody dared suggest that opium might be acceptable to any extent. 22 Opium had been made even more infamous since the warlord era: the connection between the rule of warlords and the legalization of opium for profit was often pointed out (Minguo ribao, December 28, 1922; January 29, 1923) . 23 As a consequence, legalizing the drug was not only against Sun's personal convictions but also had a genuine cost in terms of political legitimacy, especially since the Guomindang was claiming to be a progressive and revolutionary force. In that regard, it is important to pay attention to the way opium laws were written and made public.
The case of the opium prohibition rules (jinyan tiaoli ) promulgated by Sun
Yat-sen on January 16, 1924, is especially interesting: the document reads more or less like the outline of a prohibition policy. Article 2 states that "all the arrangements regarding opium suppression" (yiqie jinyan shiyi i.e., opium management) are to be supervised by the jinyan duban. Then, the great majority of its twenty-two articles are devoted to stating the punishments for opium smokers (Article 13), for people opening opium houses (Article 14), boiling and planting opium (Articles 11-12), and so on. One has to read between the lines that opium (yapian ) in this context actually means smuggled opium. Only one article (Article 7) is actually devoted to legal opium, euphemistically called "detoxification medicine" (jieyan yaopin ) (Ma 1998, 763) . To gain insight into the real management of the jinyan dubanshu, it is necessary to refer to the various regulations issued by the successive duban during the following months. 24 (However, their main concern was not so much the inner organization of the monopoly as contraband.) 25 As a consequence, the legal apparatus during this period was based on a dichotomy.
On the one hand, a law was published by the highest authority stating the overall principles of the opium policy (quite deceiving, as it was in the eyes of a layman taking the shape of a policy of suppression). On the other hand, a flow of regulations dealing with the day-to-day management of opium was published whenever it was deemed necessary by the opium administration itself. These regulations, being of a more technical and matter-of-fact nature, provide insight into the way the opium system was actually managed. 26 The authorities were, however, reluctant to publicize these kinds of regulations, and the press only sporadically published them, making them harder to screen out.
A New Deal (June 1925)
However confusing its formulation, the 1924 legalization was a watershed, as opium would remain legal until 1936. A proclamation of immediate prohibition was published on June 20, 1925, in the outbreak of enthusiasm following the victory of the Guomindang over the rebellion of its most troublesome partners (Yang Ximin and his ally Liu Zhenhuan, the chief of the Guangxi forces), but it turned out to be a flash in the pan (Guangzhou minguo ribao, June 22, 1925; June 23, 1925) . Nonetheless, the victory over Yang and Liu opened a new area. It made the party tighten its grip over Guangdong (and the situation would improve further by the end of the year, as the eastern part of Guangdong, which had remained under the domination of Chen Jiongming, was taken).
In the context of such an improved political situation, new jinyan tiaoli were promulgated on August 1, 1925 (Ma 1998 . These rules were innovative in several aspects. First, the regulations featured a long preamble (under the heading liyou
[justification]), in which the evils of opium are exposed at length (it is a social plague; it is the cause of China's present state of weakness; and so on). It also stated that Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan should be held responsible for the de facto situation of unrestrained consumption. 27 This interpretation offered great possibilities: the situation regarding opium was acknowledged as bad, but this was supposed to be the result of preceding evildoers.
Because of the number of people addicted to opium, the next logical step was to put into force a policy of gradual suppression by issuing permits (in the same manner as the TenYear Plan) over a period of four years. Molding the regulations into the shape of a plan organized within a yearly time frame was not only a way to postpone effective suppression or to mimic the Ten-Year Plan. In Republican politics, planning meant modernity, science, and progress and was considered no less than a political panacea. 28 The distinctive appeal of planned regulations dated back to the Xinzheng period, 29 with the Nine-Year Plan for the formation of a parliament launched in 1908 (Rhoads 2000, 129) . Later, the Soviet experience of economic planning further reinforced the interest of the Chinese intellectual and political elite in this approach.
30
With the goal of securing a better grip over opium revenues, the jinyan duban was put under the Ministry of Finance, an innovation that lasted. Over the years, the name of the opium administration (which changed many times) sometimes reflected the affiliation with (Huazi ribao, June 6, 1928; Chen Dayou 1963, 68; Yuehuabao, July 12, 1929) .
As under the Ten-Year Plan, smoking permits became an important part of the system (attached to the jinyan tiaoli, a whole set of regulations-jinyan lingpai zhangcheng -was devoted to this question). Smoking permits were meant to be a more humane way to help opium smokers quit by letting them regularly decrease their daily dose. Every addicted smoker (you yapianyinzhe ) had to state his daily consumption, along with other information (such as name, age, and address). The permit fee was modest and in proportion to daily consumption (10 yuan a year if the person smoked more than 6 qian a day, 5 yuan if the person smoked from 3 to 6 qian, and 1 yuan if the person smoked less than 3 qian a day). In the following years, new regulations were issued. These regulations betray a concern for better control over the consumption of opium at home (where regulation was more stringent than in the opium houses, where no permit was required). In the 1930s permit holders were compelled to purchase a certain amount of opium per month in order to minimize the possibility of their consuming smuggled opium at home. The permits were used to make money by heavily taxing wealthy smokers (in 1929, the most expensive permit, tebiezheng, enabled its bearer to smoke any kind of opium anywhere, with the guarantee of being undisturbed by opium administration inspectors, but it cost an exorbitant 100 yuan per month). Finally, a temporary (daily) permit could be purchased to gain the right to smoke in places like brothels, hostels, and restaurants: this option was aimed at controlling consumption in these locations, as well as collecting extra revenue. (Remick 2004, 57, 78-88) , which was then widely preferred, but he improved the method for selecting farmers and pressed for competition in the auctioning process (Yang 2001, 27-35 opium from a producing region or conducting the wholesale trade of opium in a given area, and they operated under the tight control of official agencies.
Song successfully addressed one of the major challenges the opium administration had to face when legalization became effective: smuggling. He certainly benefited from the fall of Liu and Yang, enthusiastic smugglers whose military strength placed them beyond the reach of the opium administration. Yet opium was not a bulky item, and Guangdong had many connections by water with the producing provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou.
Smuggling opium was still relatively easy and tempting, because it could generate huge profits. Smuggled opium could efficiently challenge legal opium, because it was much cheaper and easy to mix with legal opium.
In the long run, the main tactic used to curb smuggling was the quota system. One can go so far as to say that it became the backbone of the opium administration system. As previously noted, smokers had to hold a permit to smoke at home and had to purchase a minimum amount of opium each month. But the system extended to opium brokers, who were compelled to sell a certain quota of legal opium per month corresponding to the size of the potential market to which they were granted the right to sell. If they did not reach the quota, they were fined.
Smuggling was also a concern when it came to poppy cultivation. Like his predecessors, Song prohibited planting in Guangdong and tried to never use local opium for supplying the monopoly, because the climate was unfit for growing poppies: Guangdong could yield only very poor-quality opium. But since the sole districts suitable for growing poppies were located near Chaozhou in a region where the hold of provincial authorities was precarious, it was safer to rely exclusively on opium from Yunnan and Guizhou along the Xijiang.
32 Song installed a series of checkpoints on the river to guarantee better control (Slack 2001, 77-79) .
As a whole, Song was successful in curbing smuggling. His actions are clearly important: after 1928 the Guomindang drew on its experience as a Guangdong-based power and put into place the same kind of organization at the national level.
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The Great Increase in Opium Revenues
Song Ziwen's reorganization also led to a sharp increase in opium revenues. It is a complicated task to evaluate the revenues derived from opium during the period from 1923 to 
The Opium System under Chen Jitang
After the completion of the Beifa, Guangdong remained under the control of Nanjing for three years, until 1931. The opium laws introduced during this period were more or less the same as those enacted in Nanjing. In 1931, an anti-Jiang movement unfolded in Guangdong after Jiang Jiechi (Chiang Kai-shek) put Hu Hanmin under house arrest in late February. Chen Jitang (then the commander of the Guangdong army) seized this opportunity to assert his leadership over Guangdong (see figure 2) . 37 The province would again enjoy a great deal of autonomy during the five years of Chen's warlord-style regime. As a whole, the opium system kept the same features inherited from the Song Ziwen period during these years, 38 with two notable changes. The first change took place in the early 1930s: opium houses became a crucial element in controlling the system. All of the published laws either explicitly forbid or failed to mention opium houses, because they were an especially sensitive issue (Jinyan tiaoli, August 1, 1925, article 7). They represented the most visible manifestation of the drug; as such, they were a particular concern for anti-opium activists and public opinion. Reading the laws, one has no sense that opium houses existed all over the place during the period (there were about 350 in Canton during the mid-1930s). 39 If opium houses had remained relatively free of administrative interference during the first years of the monopoly, a new effort was made to ensure stricter control over them in the early 1930s. They were, for example, denied the right they had so far enjoyed to boil opium on their premises, in order to avoid the "cutting" of official opium with smuggled opium or other substances, a practice that was once universal and an "open secret" (gongkai de mimi ) (Minguo ribao, July 27, 1931). Instead, the opium houses were now required to sell the official brand in sealed boxes containing the exact quantity the customer wanted to smoke (Xianggang gongshang ribao, June 19, 1935) , to abide by quotas, and to sell a certain amount of opium per day (Yuehuabao, June 7, 1930; June 10, 1930; July 3, 1933; August 20, 1933 taxes were levied on them, including a monthly license fee and fees proportional to the number of opium sets available for consumers ' use (Yuehuabao, February 7, 1930) .
I have pointed out the potentially deceptive nature of the laws and, by contrast, underlined the revealing nature of more matter-of-fact regulations. Yet the potential usefulness of these regulations for deciphering the reality of the situation should not be painted too optimistically. A poster kept in the Guangdong Archives displaying a set of regulations pertaining to inspections is a good case in point. This poster was probably intended to be displayed in opium houses; yet even in this set of regulations, absolutely no explicit reference is made to opium houses; instead, it allegedly dealt with "private dwellings" (minjufangshi ). 40 One point was especially crucial: if authorities had reason to suspect an opium house of illegal activities (like the selling of adulterated or smuggled opium) and wanted to investigate, agents from the Guangdong Opium Suppression
Office, formed on December 1, 1929, had to be accompanied by members of the official police forces. Several news items published in the Canton press testify to the fact that the rulers of opium houses were perfectly aware of their rights in that matter and rebuffed agents who would not abide by this regulation (Yuehuabao, October 1, 1933; June 27, 1934) . The reason for this measure was simple: the Guangdong jinyanju wanted to avoid extortions-in particular, false accusations and blackmailing that could very well result from its own unscrupulous agents (most of whom enjoyed the reputation of being shady characters) (Chen 1963, 126; Huazi ribao, June 12, 1928) . But the authorities were too embarrassed to straightforwardly state that they were actually concerned with the protection of the infamous opium houses.
The second innovation to take place under the rule of Chen Jitang was that the Guangdong jinyanju, instead of being placed under the authority of the Ministry of Finances, was now under the firm grip of Huo Zhiting, a questionable character who had an impressive command over gambling and opium operations in Guangdong (Renjianshi 38:19, October 20, 1935; Wei 1964, 111 ) (see figure 3) . But once again, he did not control the complete distribution network and still used subfarming. 41 Huo maintained a low profile, never appearing as head of the Guangdong jinyanju. 
The Influence of the Six-Year Plan on Guangdong
Jiang Jieshi used the Six-Year Plan to financially weaken local warlords who challenged his power. For example, by redirecting the opium routes connecting some of the main provinces of poppy production (Yunnan, Guizhou) to the Lower Yangzi regions (with its huge consumption markets) (Marshall 1976, 26-27; Zhu, Jiang, and Zhang 1995, 147) , he deprived the new Guangxi clique warlords of the transit taxes they levied along the Xijiang, an important source of income for them (Burton 1933a (Burton , 1933b .
But this is not the whole story. Jiang Jieshi speculated widely on the national consensus about the need to eradicate opium. By organizing a complete and credible plan of opium suppression, the Nanking government established itself as the only legitimate authority in that regard. Jiang himself, as a leader, benefited from the Six-Year Plan, as the propaganda that accompanied it cleverly suggested that he was the heir of Lin Zexu (Paulès 2007, 207-209) . Also worthy of attention is the fact that the new opium laws were in tune with the international commitments of China. Jiang received praise from the League of Nations for his new opium policy, thereby increasing his political stature. 43 Historically, it has not been uncommon for the law to be used as a tool by a centralizing power struggling with centrifugal forces. (Favier 1978, 93-94) . Guangdong is an excellent example of how national laws enacted by the Nanjing government regarding the Six-Year Plan seriously challenged the legitimacy of local autocrats like Chen Jitang.
In the flow of official publications aimed at celebrating the achievements of the SixYear Plan, the absence of Guangdong Province (as well as Guangxi) was glaring. 44 This was unbearable to the Guangdong intellectual elites. They soon urged Chen Jitang to take similar action. 45 It is important to observe that the projected suppression campaign was supposed to end in 1940, the same year as the Nanking Six-Year Plan: obviously Chen's aim was to show that Guangdong's anti-opium action was not lagging. There would be more projects of this sort in the last months of Chen Jitang's rule in Guangdong. But all convey the same impression of being mere gestures attempting to save time, and nothing concrete came out of them (Paulès 2010, 131-133) .
It is generally accepted that the death of Hu Hanmin (who had since late 1931 taken residence in Hong Kong and provided moral support to Chen's regime) on May 12, 1936, was decisive in depriving Chen Jitang of his legitimacy and led to his fall two months later.
Even if it is difficult to state the extent to which opium politics also undermined Chen's legitimacy, it seems certain that they did so.
Conclusion
The Guangdong authorities faced a dilemma regarding opium during most of the period from 1912 to 1936. On the one hand, this substance was considered a symbol of China's weakness and backwardness and its suppression was deemed a priority. But on the other hand, opium taxes were an indispensable source of fiscal income. Before 1924, the authorities tried to overcome this dilemma either by enforcing an opium prohibition or by secretly deriving profit from opium traffic, but without granting it legalization (the monopoly of Long Jiguang in 1915 and 1916 was an exception). The year 1924 was a turning point, as Sun Yat-sen decided to legalize the drug. The authorities then openly ruled an opium monopoly but tried their best to come out with "acceptable" opium regulations. Laws were necessary tools, as some degree of official implication was deemed necessary for better control over the management of opium and to derive more revenue from it. Regulations became more accurate and comprehensive and proved successful in increasing opium revenues. Yet the Guangdong monopoly never took the shape of government control over all facets of the circuit. Traditional tax-farming arrangements with local opium merchants (though under stricter supervision) remained the core of the opium monopoly.
Considering the period as a whole, the dichotomy between warlords and non-warlords seems irrelevant. Power holders who can rightly be labeled "warlords," like Long Jiguang (from 1913 to 1915) and the old Guangxi clique, profited from opium, but in a rather limited and discreet way, as they didn't dare legalize it. It was the allegedly progressive regime of Sun that enacted legalization. Moreover, regarding matters related to opium, continuity prevailed between the Guomindang and Chen Jitang during the period from 1924 to 1936.
As to the relation between central and local opium laws, this article shows the lasting influence of the 1906 Ten-Year Plan, which remained a strong paradigm during the whole period in question. In several instances, features of the Guangdong opium laws were directly inspired by the Ten-Year Plan, most notably the yearly time frame and the distribution of smoking permits.
Just like other power holders, warlords had to be concerned about public opinion. 46 This article reveals that the Nanking regime used the Six-Year Plan (1934 -1940 as a way to delegitimize the regime of Chen Jitang and deprive it of the considerable public support it enjoyed in Guangdong. It is important, therefore, to underscore that central and local laws did not simply coexist but sometimes actually competed with one another. This is a crucial and overlooked part of the struggle between Nanking's and China's centrifugal forces. UC Berkeley, September 20-22, 2012 , for providing insightful remarks and critical feedback.
Notes
1
The first attempt to deal with opium laws on a truly scholarly basis helped establish this trend, as it deliberately focused on central government laws, even while paying some attention to the provincial-level implementation of the Ten-Year Plan (Yu 1934, 1, 139-146) . 2
During the nineteenth century, the general opinion in China regarding opium was negative, but the issue was at least up for debate. In that regard, the last decade of the nineteenth century represented a turning point: thinkers like Liang Qichao or Yan Fu considered opium to be one of the main causes of China's weakness and a source of shame (guochi ) for the country. Along with other practices, like foot binding or prostitution, opium smoking became a way to elaborate on the plight of China. The opium smoker dozing on his couch became a metaphor of China as the sick man of Asia. This was one of the main reasons for the Qing's commitment to eradicating opium. 3
For example, the beginning of Article 2 of the May 1911 agreement between China and Great Britain over the matter reads as follows: "The Chinese Government have adopted a most vigorous policy for prohibiting the production, the transport, and the smoking of native opium, and His Majesty's Government has expressed their agreement therewith and willingness to give every assistance" (FO 228/2444). The Chinese version may be found in Yu (1934, 259) . 4
Yan Xishan is the most famous for his anti-opium action in Shanxi, the province under his control (Harrison 2006, 163-173; Wang Hongbin 1997, 371) . 5
Guangdong gongbao , no. 124 (December 12, 1912 ), no. 163 (February 13, 1913 ; clippings from the Canton press, as translated in the file OM GGI 65400. 6
See FO 228/1869 (Intelligence report on Canton for the four months ending January 31, 1913); OM GGI 65400 (Note from the Canton French consul to the Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine concerning the Revolution in Guangdong, August 10-17, 1912 Fitzgerald (1996, 147-154, 198-203 January 22, 1924; January 23, 1924. 25 The extent of smuggling made it difficult to find someone willing to farm out the opium revenues. The main concern of the various heads of the jinyan dubanshu (opium suppression superintendent's office), up to the middle of 1925 would be to release the grip of the mercenaries over the opium market (Guangzhou minguo ribao, February 25, 1924; April 8, 1924; April 28, 1924; and September 2, 1924) . 26 This is not to say, of course, that they are fully reliable: a careful investigation into other sources, such as Canton and Hong Kong newspapers, anti-opium activists'
Paulès 79
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 7 (June 2013) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-7) surveys, collections of historical materials (wenshi ziliao), and diplomatic reports, is necessary. 27 It was a clever move to hold Liu and Yang responsible, but, as has been stated, they were enrolled by Sun to drive Chen Jiongming (who had successfully enforced the prohibition of opium) out of Guangdong. Moreover, Liu and Yang were not the only ones to profit from opium between 1923 and 1925. Some local strongmen who were still faithful allies of the Guomindang in July 1925 (like Li Fulin) had done exactly the same (Paulès 2010, 82-93) . 28 One famous example of the political elites' fascination with planning is the Fifty-Year Plan for national economic development issued by Sun Fo in 1928 (Kirby 2000, 141-142) . 29 Of course, Chinese administrative circles had long known about gradual long-term policies-for hydraulic works, for instance-but such policies were not framed in a tight and regular timetable, reflecting a new perception of time that took shape during the Xinzheng (Bastid-Bruguière 2001, 41-54) . 30 This is true even of intellectual figures like Zhang Junmai, who were more inclined to take a critical stance toward the Soviet Union (Chi 1986, 147-149 August 6, 1929 , quoted in MAE, Série Asie, 1918 -1929 , sous-série affaires communes, file no. 53 (Report by Lieutenant Laurin dated October 9, 1929 . No more precise mention of the currency is made besides "dollar," but I am assuming it is the Canton dollar. 36 Estimating opium revenues and their part in the province's fiscal income during this period is a complex issue discussed in detail in Paulès (2010, 126-127) . 37 For a detailed account of the 1931 anti-Jiang movement whereabouts, see So (1991, 191-199) . 38 Interestingly, the Guangdong sugar monopoly created in June 1934 faced the same sorts of constraints, in particular intensive smuggling, and shared some of the main features of the opium suppression system (farming, subfarming, sales quotas) (Hill 2010, 148-155) . 39 Yet some regulations concerning them appeared sometimes (see Guangzhou minguo ribao, February 25, 1924 
